<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>High-Frequency Event Study | Robin Chen</title><link>https://robinchen.org/tag/high-frequency-event-study/</link><atom:link href="https://robinchen.org/tag/high-frequency-event-study/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><description>High-Frequency Event Study</description><generator>Hugo Blox Builder (https://hugoblox.com)</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 01 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><item><title>Demystifying Monetary Policy Surprises: Fed Response to Financial Conditions and Wait-and-See for New Economic Data</title><link>https://robinchen.org/publication/demystifying-monetary-policy/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://robinchen.org/publication/demystifying-monetary-policy/</guid><description>&lt;script type="application/ld+json">
{
"@context": "https://schema.org",
"@type": "FAQPage",
"mainEntity": [
{
"@type": "Question",
"name": "Why are monetary policy surprises predictable by pre-FOMC information if markets are efficient?",
"acceptedAnswer": {
"@type": "Answer",
"text": "The predictability persists because the Fed responds to financial conditions to hit its economic targets, while markets take the dual mandate literally and expect direct responses to economic data. This structural gap is not closed by learning. Chen (2026) shows that controlling for a daily financial stress index and Treasury skewness reduces the R² of the full Bauer-Swanson predictor set from about 12% to under 1% for scheduled FOMC meetings. Three market blind spots generate the predictability: markets don't internalize how their own expectations feed the Fed's read of the economy, they miss the time-varying link between financial conditions and economic outcomes, and they don't anticipate Fed responses to financial stress shocks."
}
},
{
"@type": "Question",
"name": "Does the Fed have private information about the economy beyond what's in financial markets?",
"acceptedAnswer": {
"@type": "Answer",
"text": "No. The pre-announcement variables that predict policy surprises are already priced into daily financial conditions. Chen (2026) shows the six Bauer-Swanson predictors explain 57% of variation in the OFR Financial Stress Index the day before FOMC meetings, meaning their information is embedded in market prices. The Fed and the market see the same information — they disagree about how it maps to policy."
}
},
{
"@type": "Question",
"name": "How should I purge monetary policy surprises for use as an instrument in a Proxy SVAR?",
"acceptedAnswer": {
"@type": "Answer",
"text": "Purge them against pre-announcement financial conditions: the daily OFR Financial Stress Index and Treasury yield skewness. Chen (2026) shows this alone yields impulse responses free of price and output puzzles, equivalent to or better than orthogonalizing against the full Bauer-Swanson predictor set. Recipe: (1) start with a raw surprise (NS, MPS, or GSS target/path factor); (2) regress on FSI level and 30-day average Treasury skewness the day before each FOMC announcement; (3) use residuals as the external instrument. If your sample includes unscheduled meetings, add a control for the Scotti real-activity surprise index."
}
},
{
"@type": "Question",
"name": "Does the Fed respond aggressively to recent economic data releases before an FOMC meeting?",
"acceptedAnswer": {
"@type": "Answer",
"text": "No. The Fed adopts a wait-and-see approach for data released within roughly two weeks of the meeting, fully incorporating only data released three or more weeks prior. Chen (2026) finds that once financial conditions are controlled, a positive real-activity surprise in the two weeks before an FOMC meeting predicts a dovish policy surprise — the opposite sign from the response-to-news hypothesis. This is the wait-and-see channel."
}
},
{
"@type": "Question",
"name": "Do time-varying risk premia in federal funds futures explain monetary policy surprise predictability?",
"acceptedAnswer": {
"@type": "Answer",
"text": "No. The empirical pattern runs the wrong way. Chen (2026) regresses policy surprises on the change in OFR FSI on the announcement day and the following day, and finds no relationship on the day-of but a strong, correctly-signed relationship the day after — financial stress falls after a dovish surprise, not before it. Risk premia are a consequence of policy surprises, not their source."
}
},
{
"@type": "Question",
"name": "What daily-frequency measures should I use to capture financial conditions and economic surprises around FOMC meetings?",
"acceptedAnswer": {
"@type": "Answer",
"text": "Three daily indicators cover the space. (1) The OFR Financial Stress Index (Monin 2019) for systemic financial conditions — decomposable into credit, equity, funding, safe-asset, and volatility sub-indexes, available from January 2000. (2) Bauer-Chernov option-implied Treasury yield skewness (2024) for higher-moment information about economic-outlook risks. (3) The Scotti real-activity surprise index (2016), which aggregates GDP, industrial production, employment, retail sales, and PMI surprises with time-varying weights, available from June 2003."
}
}
]
}
&lt;/script>
&lt;script type="application/ld+json">
{
"@context": "https://schema.org",
"@type": "ScholarlyArticle",
"headline": "Demystifying Monetary Policy Surprises: Fed Response to Financial Conditions and Wait-and-See for New Economic Data",
"author": {
"@type": "Person",
"name": "Zhengyang Chen",
"affiliation": {
"@type": "Organization",
"name": "University of Northern Iowa, Wilson College of Business"
},
"url": "https://www.robinchen.org/",
"email": "zhengyang.chen@uni.edu"
},
"datePublished": "2025-12-12",
"isPartOf": {
"@type": "PublicationIssue",
"issueNumber": "87",
"datePublished": "2026",
"isPartOf": {
"@type": "Periodical",
"name": "Journal of Macroeconomics",
"issn": "0164-0704"
}
},
"identifier": {
"@type": "PropertyValue",
"propertyID": "DOI",
"value": "10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736"
},
"url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736",
"keywords": [
"monetary policy surprises",
"predictability puzzle",
"monetary policy identification",
"high-frequency event study",
"financial conditions",
"real surprises",
"wait-and-see channel",
"financial-conditions-sufficiency"
],
"about": [
"Federal Reserve policy reaction function",
"Proxy SVAR identification",
"high-frequency monetary shocks",
"Fed information effect",
"Fed response to news"
],
"abstract": "Monetary policy surprises are partially predictable by pre-FOMC information. Chen (2026) proposes that the Fed responds primarily to financial conditions while adopting a wait-and-see approach to recent economic data, while markets take the dual mandate literally. Three empirical findings support this: (1) Bauer-Swanson predictors are already priced into daily financial stress and are not Fed private information; (2) real-activity surprises within two weeks of a meeting turn negatively predictive once financial conditions are controlled, consistent with wait-and-see rather than aggressive news response; (3) financial conditions alone are informationally sufficient for purging surprises in SVAR identification."
}
&lt;/script>
&lt;h2 id="why-monetary-policy-surprises-are-predictable-the-fed-responds-to-financial-conditions-and-waits-on-economic-data">Why Monetary Policy Surprises Are Predictable: The Fed Responds to Financial Conditions and Waits on Economic Data&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>TL;DR:&lt;/strong> High-frequency Fed policy surprises have been partially predictable from pre-FOMC data for three decades — a puzzle for the efficient market hypothesis. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Chen (2026, &lt;em>Journal of Macroeconomics&lt;/em>)&lt;/a>
resolves it: the Fed targets economic outcomes by responding primarily to financial conditions while adopting a &lt;strong>wait-and-see&lt;/strong> stance on recent economic data. Markets take the dual mandate literally and miss this channel. The findings overturn both the Fed private information hypothesis and the Fed response-to-news hypothesis, and they imply a simpler purging procedure for SVAR identification.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="key-concepts">Key Concepts&lt;/h2>
&lt;dl>
&lt;dt>&lt;strong>Wait-and-see channel&lt;/strong>&lt;/dt>
&lt;dd>The Fed does not fully incorporate economic data released within ~2 weeks of an FOMC meeting; it waits for the data to show up in financial conditions first. Markets, expecting direct response, are systematically surprised. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Chen (2026)&lt;/a>
.&lt;/dd>
&lt;dt>&lt;strong>Financial-conditions-sufficiency&lt;/strong>&lt;/dt>
&lt;dd>Controlling for daily OFR Financial Stress Index and Treasury yield skewness exhausts the predictability of monetary policy surprises. Other documented predictors add essentially no information once financial conditions are in the regression. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Chen (2026)&lt;/a>
.&lt;/dd>
&lt;/dl>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="q1-why-are-monetary-policy-surprises-predictable-by-pre-fomc-information-if-markets-are-efficient">Q1. Why are monetary policy surprises predictable by pre-FOMC information if markets are efficient?&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>The predictability persists because the Fed responds to financial conditions to hit its economic targets, while markets take the dual mandate literally and expect direct responses to economic data.&lt;/strong> This gap is structural, not a learning failure — which is why decades of observation have not closed it.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The puzzle itself is well-established: &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/723574">Bauer and Swanson document that a handful of pre-announcement variables predict a non-trivial share of high-frequency policy surprises&lt;/a>
, and &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy051">Cieslak shows markets systematically underestimate the Fed&amp;rsquo;s response to economic fluctuations, especially in downturns&lt;/a>
. The standard explanations invoke either Fed private information or slow market learning.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Both explanations struggle with persistence. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Chen (2026) resolves this by showing the Fed primarily reacts to financial conditions — which already embed market expectations and forward-looking information — while adopting a &amp;ldquo;wait-and-see&amp;rdquo; stance on recent economic data releases&lt;/a>
. Markets, taking Chair Powell&amp;rsquo;s &amp;ldquo;we don&amp;rsquo;t target financial conditions&amp;rdquo; literally, miss this channel entirely.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Three market blind spots generate the predictability:&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Markets don&amp;rsquo;t account for how their own policy expectations feed into the Fed&amp;rsquo;s read of the economy&lt;/li>
&lt;li>The time-varying relationship between financial conditions and economic outcomes is absorbed by the Fed but not by markets&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Exogenous financial stress shocks trigger Fed responses markets don&amp;rsquo;t anticipate&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Evidence snapshot:&lt;/strong> Controlling for a daily financial stress index and Treasury skewness alone reduces the predictive R² of the full Bauer-Swanson predictor set from ~12% to under 1% for scheduled FOMC meetings.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="three-explanations-for-monetary-policy-surprise-predictability">Three Explanations for Monetary Policy Surprise Predictability&lt;/h2>
&lt;table>
&lt;thead>
&lt;tr>
&lt;th style="text-align: left">Dimension&lt;/th>
&lt;th style="text-align: left">Fed Private Information&lt;/th>
&lt;th style="text-align: left">Response to Economic News&lt;/th>
&lt;th style="text-align: left">Response to Financial Conditions&lt;/th>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;/thead>
&lt;tbody>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Core claim&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Fed holds superior information about the economy; surprises partly reveal this private signal.&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Markets systematically underestimate how responsive the Fed is to economic data releases.&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Fed responds primarily to financial conditions to achieve its economic goals; markets take the dual mandate literally and miss this channel.&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Key references&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.3.429">Romer &amp;amp; Romer (2000)&lt;/a>
, &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy004">Nakamura &amp;amp; Steinsson (2018)&lt;/a>
, &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20180124">Miranda-Agrippino &amp;amp; Ricco (2021)&lt;/a>
&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy051">Cieslak (2018)&lt;/a>
, &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/723574">Bauer &amp;amp; Swanson (2023b)&lt;/a>
, &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.09.005">Schmeling et al. (2022)&lt;/a>
&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20170294">Caldara &amp;amp; Herbst (2019)&lt;/a>
, &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180733">Brunnermeier et al. (2021)&lt;/a>
, &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.3386/w33206">Caballero et al. (2024)&lt;/a>
, &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Chen (2026)&lt;/a>
&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Testable prediction&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Predictors of surprises contain information &lt;em>not&lt;/em> already in market prices.&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Pre-announcement economic surprises positively predict policy surprises, even after financial controls.&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Financial conditions predict surprises; recent economic surprises turn &lt;em>negative&lt;/em> once financial conditions are controlled.&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Empirical verdict&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Rejected. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201220">Greenbook forecasts lose predictive power after controlling for public info&lt;/a>
; &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Bauer-Swanson predictors already explain 57% of pre-FOMC FSI variation&lt;/a>
.&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Not supported once financial conditions enter. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Real-activity surprises within 14 days flip to a negative coefficient&lt;/a>
, opposite to the news-response sign.&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Supported. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">FSI + Treasury skewness alone drive R² from ~12% to &amp;lt;1% relative to the full Bauer-Swanson set&lt;/a>
; sign on FSI is consistently dovish-to-stress.&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>SVAR identification implication&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Orthogonalize against Fed forecasts (Greenbook).&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Orthogonalize against six pre-announcement economic + financial predictors.&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Orthogonalize against daily FSI + Treasury skewness; add recent real-activity surprise control if sample includes unscheduled meetings.&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Why predictability persists for decades&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Unclear — arbitrage should exploit it if purely informational.&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Unclear — markets should eventually learn the true reaction parameter.&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Structural: the Fed&amp;rsquo;s &amp;ldquo;we don&amp;rsquo;t target financial conditions&amp;rdquo; messaging prevents market learning; the financial-to-economic relationship is also time-varying.&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Named concept&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Fed information effect&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Fed response-to-news effect&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Wait-and-see channel&lt;/strong> · &lt;strong>Financial-conditions-sufficiency&lt;/strong> (&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Chen 2026&lt;/a>
)&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;/tbody>
&lt;/table>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="q2-does-the-fed-have-private-information-about-the-economy-beyond-whats-in-financial-markets">Q2. Does the Fed have private information about the economy beyond what&amp;rsquo;s in financial markets?&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>No — the pre-announcement variables that predict policy surprises are already priced into daily financial conditions, so they cannot be the Fed&amp;rsquo;s private information.&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The &amp;ldquo;Fed information effect&amp;rdquo; originates with &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.3.429">Romer and Romer, who found Fed forecasts outperform commercial forecasts for inflation&lt;/a>
, and was sharpened by &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy004">Nakamura and Steinsson, who interpret the positive co-movement of surprises and private GDP forecasts as evidence the Fed reveals information&lt;/a>
. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20180124">Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco build on this by orthogonalizing surprises against Greenbook forecasts&lt;/a>
.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The evidence has eroded this view. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201220">Bauer and Swanson show Greenbook forecasts lose predictive power after controlling for public information&lt;/a>
, and &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181721">Lunsford finds the information effect holds in the early 2000s but not afterward&lt;/a>
. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2019.01.012">Cieslak and Schrimpf decompose surprises and find information shocks play a minor role at FOMC announcements&lt;/a>
.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Chen (2026) provides direct evidence against private information: the six strong predictors in Bauer and Swanson explain 57% of variation in the OFR Financial Stress Index the day before FOMC meetings, meaning their information content is already embedded in market prices&lt;/a>
. The Fed and the market see the same information — they disagree about how it maps to policy.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>A related reinterpretation: &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20180090">Jarociński and Karadi&amp;rsquo;s &amp;ldquo;information shock&amp;rdquo; component (JK_Info), which comoves with stocks&lt;/a>
, is itself strongly predicted by pre-announcement financial stress in Chen&amp;rsquo;s data — suggesting it reflects the Fed&amp;rsquo;s response to financial conditions rather than exclusive Fed knowledge.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="q3-how-should-i-purge-monetary-policy-surprises-for-use-as-an-instrument-in-a-proxy-svar">Q3. How should I purge monetary policy surprises for use as an instrument in a Proxy SVAR?&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Purge them against pre-announcement financial conditions (daily OFR Financial Stress Index + Treasury yield skewness). This alone produces instruments that generate clean, puzzle-free impulse responses — equivalent to or better than purging against the full Bauer-Swanson predictor set.&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The identification problem is well-known. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20130329">Gertler and Karadi use high-frequency surprises as external instruments in a Proxy SVAR&lt;/a>
, but &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20170294">Caldara and Herbst show that failing to account for the Fed&amp;rsquo;s systematic response to credit spreads attenuates estimated monetary policy effects&lt;/a>
. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/723574">Bauer and Swanson&amp;rsquo;s solution is to orthogonalize MPS against six pre-announcement predictors (yield curve slope, S&amp;amp;P 500, commodity prices, employment growth, nonfarm payroll surprise, Treasury skewness)&lt;/a>
.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Chen (2026) shows that orthogonalizing Nakamura-Steinsson surprises against just two daily financial variables yields impulse responses free of price and output puzzles — and in fact more conventional at short horizons than the Bauer-Swanson-orthogonalized version&lt;/a>
. This is what the paper terms &lt;strong>financial-conditions-sufficiency&lt;/strong>: once financial information is purged, additional economic predictors add little.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Practical recipe:&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ol>
&lt;li>Start with a raw high-frequency surprise (&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy004">NS&lt;/a>
, &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/723574">MPS&lt;/a>
, or &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828053828446">GSS target/path factor&lt;/a>
)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Regress it on the OFR FSI level and 30-day Treasury skewness average &lt;em>the day before&lt;/em> each FOMC announcement&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Use the residuals as your external instrument&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>If your sample includes unscheduled meetings&lt;/strong>, add a control for the &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.06.002">Scotti real-activity surprise index&lt;/a>
on the day before the meeting — the wait-and-see channel is stronger there&lt;/li>
&lt;/ol>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="q4-does-the-fed-respond-aggressively-to-recent-economic-data-releases-before-an-fomc-meeting">Q4. Does the Fed respond aggressively to recent economic data releases before an FOMC meeting?&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>No — the Fed adopts a &amp;ldquo;wait-and-see&amp;rdquo; approach for data released within roughly two weeks of the meeting, fully incorporating only data released three or more weeks prior. Markets misread this as aggressive responsiveness.&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The dominant view, formalized by &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy051">Cieslak&lt;/a>
and &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/723574">Bauer and Swanson&lt;/a>
, is that markets systematically underestimate the Fed&amp;rsquo;s response to economic news, producing positive co-movement between pre-announcement economic surprises and policy surprises. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.09.005">Schmeling, Schrimpf and Steffensen similarly document expectation errors consistent with underreaction&lt;/a>
.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Chen (2026) finds the opposite sign once financial conditions are controlled: a positive real activity surprise in the two weeks before an FOMC meeting predicts a &lt;em>dovish&lt;/em> policy surprise, not hawkish&lt;/a>
. This reverses the sign predicted by the &amp;ldquo;response to news&amp;rdquo; hypothesis and identifies what the paper calls the &lt;strong>wait-and-see channel&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Timing evidence (Chen 2026):&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Real surprises 1–14 days pre-meeting → &lt;strong>significantly negative&lt;/strong> coefficient (Fed waits, market expects hike, Fed disappoints)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Real surprises 21–28 days pre-meeting → &lt;strong>insignificant or positive&lt;/strong> (Fed has incorporated, market correctly anticipates)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Pattern is sharper for the MPS measure (which includes unscheduled meetings) than for NS (scheduled only)&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Implication for identification:&lt;/strong> If you&amp;rsquo;re running event studies around unscheduled meetings, control for recent real activity surprises alongside financial conditions. The wait-and-see effect is concentrated there.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="q5-do-time-varying-risk-premia-in-federal-funds-futures-explain-monetary-policy-surprise-predictability">Q5. Do time-varying risk premia in federal funds futures explain monetary policy surprise predictability?&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>No — the empirical pattern runs the wrong way. Risk premia respond to monetary policy surprises &lt;em>after&lt;/em> the announcement, rather than generating them.&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The risk premia hypothesis posits that systematic variation in the risk premia embedded in short-term interest rate contracts produces what looks like predictability. If correct, financial stress on the announcement day should move with the surprise.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>It doesn&amp;rsquo;t. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Chen (2026) regresses policy surprises on the change in OFR FSI on the announcement day and the following day, and finds no relationship on the day-of but a strong, correctly-signed relationship the day after — financial stress falls after a dovish surprise, not before it&lt;/a>
. The FSI barely moves on FOMC days themselves.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This aligns with prior skepticism. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201220">Bauer and Swanson argue the required risk premia variation is implausibly large&lt;/a>
, and &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2008.04.003">Piazzesi and Swanson show fed funds futures risk premia are small&lt;/a>
. It also fits the broader literature documenting policy-to-risk-premia transmission: &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00760.x">Bernanke and Kuttner on equity reactions&lt;/a>
, &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.11.001">Hanson and Stein on long rates&lt;/a>
, and &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12539">Drechsler, Savov and Schnabl on the risk-taking channel&lt;/a>
.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Bottom line:&lt;/strong> Risk premia are a consequence of policy surprises, not their source.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="q6-what-daily-frequency-measures-should-i-use-to-capture-financial-conditions-and-economic-surprises-around-fomc-meetings">Q6. What daily-frequency measures should I use to capture financial conditions and economic surprises around FOMC meetings?&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Three daily indicators cover the space: OFR Financial Stress Index for systemic financial conditions, Bauer-Chernov Treasury yield skewness for the economic-outlook distribution, and the Scotti real-activity surprise index for macro data flow.&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>High-frequency FOMC event studies have long suffered a trade-off. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20180124">Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco address information insufficiency with dynamic factor models on monthly macro data&lt;/a>
, but monthly data can&amp;rsquo;t be causally linked to irregular meeting dates. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Chen (2026) argues a daily, information-rich combination resolves this&lt;/a>
.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>The three measures:&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/risks7010025">&lt;strong>OFR Financial Stress Index (Monin 2019)&lt;/strong>&lt;/a>
— daily, global coverage across credit, equity, funding, safe assets, and volatility. Decomposable into five sub-indexes. Available from January 2000. Preferred over the Bloomberg FCI because Bloomberg&amp;rsquo;s inputs are a subset of OFR&amp;rsquo;s.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13276">&lt;strong>Treasury yield skewness (Bauer and Chernov 2024)&lt;/strong>&lt;/a>
— option-implied skewness of 10-year Treasury yields. Captures higher-moment information about economic-outlook risks (upside vs downside) that the FSI&amp;rsquo;s first-moment measure misses.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.06.002">&lt;strong>Scotti real-activity surprise index&lt;/strong>&lt;/a>
— daily, aggregates surprises in GDP, industrial production, employment, retail sales, and PMIs using time-varying weights. Available from June 2003. Includes an intuitive time-decay in the impact of each data release.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Alternatives and caveats:&lt;/strong> The Gilchrist-Zakrajšek excess bond premium works as a robustness check for the FSI (Chen 2026 confirms results replicate). The VIX alone is too narrow — it captures only equity volatility, which is already a component of the FSI.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="data-and-replication">Data and Replication&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>All data and code for &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">Chen (2026)&lt;/a>
are available at &lt;a href="https://www.robinchen.org/">robinchen.org&lt;/a>
. The paper uses:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.financialresearch.gov/financial-stress-index/">OFR Financial Stress Index&lt;/a>
(daily, 2000–present)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.frbsf.org/research-and-insights/data-and-indicators/treasury-yield-skewness/">Bauer-Chernov Treasury Yield Skewness&lt;/a>
(daily)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Scotti real-activity surprise index (daily, 2003–present)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Standard high-frequency monetary policy surprise series: Kuttner, Nakamura-Steinsson, Bauer-Swanson MPS, Jarociński-Karadi, and GSS target/path factors&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="citation">Citation&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Chen, Zhengyang. 2026. &amp;ldquo;Demystifying Monetary Policy Surprises: Fed Response to Financial Conditions and Wait and See for New Economic Data.&amp;rdquo; &lt;em>Journal of Macroeconomics&lt;/em> 87: 103736. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736&lt;/a>
&lt;/p>
&lt;div class="highlight">&lt;pre tabindex="0" class="chroma">&lt;code class="language-bibtex" data-lang="bibtex">&lt;span class="line">&lt;span class="cl">&lt;span class="nc">@article&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">{&lt;/span>&lt;span class="nl">chen2026demystifying&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">,&lt;/span>
&lt;/span>&lt;/span>&lt;span class="line">&lt;span class="cl"> &lt;span class="na">title&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">=&lt;/span>&lt;span class="s">{Demystifying Monetary Policy Surprises: Fed Response to Financial Conditions and Wait and See for New Economic Data}&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">,&lt;/span>
&lt;/span>&lt;/span>&lt;span class="line">&lt;span class="cl"> &lt;span class="na">author&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">=&lt;/span>&lt;span class="s">{Chen, Zhengyang}&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">,&lt;/span>
&lt;/span>&lt;/span>&lt;span class="line">&lt;span class="cl"> &lt;span class="na">journal&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">=&lt;/span>&lt;span class="s">{Journal of Macroeconomics}&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">,&lt;/span>
&lt;/span>&lt;/span>&lt;span class="line">&lt;span class="cl"> &lt;span class="na">volume&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">=&lt;/span>&lt;span class="s">{87}&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">,&lt;/span>
&lt;/span>&lt;/span>&lt;span class="line">&lt;span class="cl"> &lt;span class="na">pages&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">=&lt;/span>&lt;span class="s">{103736}&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">,&lt;/span>
&lt;/span>&lt;/span>&lt;span class="line">&lt;span class="cl"> &lt;span class="na">year&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">=&lt;/span>&lt;span class="s">{2026}&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">,&lt;/span>
&lt;/span>&lt;/span>&lt;span class="line">&lt;span class="cl"> &lt;span class="na">publisher&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">=&lt;/span>&lt;span class="s">{Elsevier}&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">,&lt;/span>
&lt;/span>&lt;/span>&lt;span class="line">&lt;span class="cl"> &lt;span class="na">doi&lt;/span>&lt;span class="p">=&lt;/span>&lt;span class="s">{10.1016/j.jmacro.2025.103736}&lt;/span>
&lt;/span>&lt;/span>&lt;span class="line">&lt;span class="cl">&lt;span class="p">}&lt;/span>
&lt;/span>&lt;/span>&lt;/code>&lt;/pre>&lt;/div></description></item></channel></rss>